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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the plausibility of four different mid-term paths of
development of the European Union (EU): first, a political union or a European state; second, a differentiated
and flexible integration of the polity; third, a covert and deepening integration of the polity outside of the
political arenas; fourth, the disintegration and/or dissolution of the EU through the exit of individual members
or a joint decision to terminate the union.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses strategic interaction analysis to identify the plausibility
of each of these four possible outcomes. By systematically varying the relevant actors’, i.e. European Council’s
and member states’, the European Parliament’s, the Commission’s, preferences over outcomes while holding
constant institutional rules of decision making on the one hand, and systematically varying institutional rules
on the other while holdings actors’ preferences constant, the paper comes to the conclusion that differentiated
and flexible integration and covert integration are the most plausible mid-term paths of development.
Findings – The paper finds that neither a European state or deep political union nor a disintegration or even
dissolution of the EU is the most plausible path of development. Rather, it concludes that flexible and
differentiated integration as well as covert integration outside the political arenas are the most likely
developments. However, it also draws attention to the political costs of flexible and differentiated integration
which does not allow for an overall view of political and policy issues negotiated at one political table, limiting
the scope of compromise formation and even leading to a fragmented polity. Covert integration consisting of
mechanisms of hidden integration “invisible” to the wider public may lead to a democratic backlash, once
citizens realize that integration has considerably deepened without their being aware of it.
Originality/value – Most publications regarding the future development of the EU are normatively driven,
either conjuring an imminent disintegration, or invoking the necessity of a deepening integration leading to a
political union. This paper, by contrast, seeks to assess the likely further development based on empirically
identified factors and a logical argument.
Keywords European Union, Brexit, Eurozone crisis, Strategic interaction analysis
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Due to important shocks such as the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit, the
European Union (EU) is faced with the challenge to reconsider its institutional architecture
in order to better deal with such shocks. Should it follow the path of an ever closer union or
United States of Europe; of a two-tier or more differentiated union; continue to muddle
through with incremental changes on a path of “covert integration”; or engage on a path of
disintegration or dissolution? In the following I will ask which of the four possible paths in
the immediate and mid-term future of the EU are most likely to unfold.
In order to answer this question I will use strategic interaction analysis, as developed by
Lake and Powell (1999). Strategic interaction analysis distinguishes between two elements
of strategic interaction: actors and their environments. On the actor side, strategic choice
analysis distinguishes between two attributes, first, actors are assumed to have preferences,
defined simply as how they rank the possible outcomes defined by the environment
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(Lake and Powell, 1999, p. 9). Actors’ basic preferences are desires that remain the same
across a wide variety of situations. Actors’ situational preferences (Frieden, 1999) consist of
the ranking of preferred outcomes in more specific situations and depend upon the
particular problem constellation and constellation of actors and their preferences over
outcomes they negotiate with. The second attribute of an actor are its prior beliefs about the
preferences of other actors. In particular, when actors are uncertain, these beliefs are crucial
for the decision about which strategy to choose, and, in consequence, for the outcome of
interaction (Lake and Powell, 1999, p. 11).
The strategic environment is composed, first, of the actions which are available for the
actors. They are summarized according to what could be the outcome of interactions of
actors, or the outcome of how decisions and events can unfold (Lake and Powell, 1999,
pp. 8-9), i.e. striving for one of the possible outcomes mentioned above a European state, a
differentiated and flexible EU, covert integration and disintegration and/or dissolution.
Second the environment is composed of an information structure that defines what the
actors can know for sure and what they have to infer from the behavior of others.
Institutional rules play an eminent role here. Keohane (1984) argued that one way in which
institutions facilitate co-operation among states is by providing more information to state
actors, especially, by providing better possibilities of monitoring each other’s behavior
(Lake and Powell, 1999, p. 9).
The analytic distinction of actors’ attributes and the attributes of the environment
implies the possibility of broad kinds of conceptual experiments (Lake and Powell, 1999).
The first conceptual experiment varies the properties of the actors, i.e. their preferences and
beliefs, while it holds the environment in which they interact constant, and derives
conclusions or hypotheses about the likely outcome of the interaction. The second
conceptual experiment varies attributes of the environment while the actors’ attributes are
held constant, and derives conclusions or hypotheses about the likely outcome of the
interaction. Using this analytic scheme I will ask: how plausible are the four different
developments described above?
The four developments, an ever closer union, differentiation, covert integration and
disintegration/dissolution constitute different features of the explanandum. I will argue
that the likeliness of the respective paths happening depends on the following factors. The
relevant factors are the most important actors’, i.e. member states and European
institutions and their preferences over outcomes, i.e. a specific path of development;
important macro factors of the environment, such as the financial and economic crisis or a
high/low influx of refugees; and the decision-making rules applied when deciding
over outcomes such as unanimity, QMV and the use of referenda in member states and
court rulings.
Using this analytic scheme, I will first ask: what is the likeliness that a federal state or
United States of Europe will materialize in a short and mid-term period?
Path 1: a European federal state or “an ever closer political union”
A political union defined as a federal state is characterized by a concentration of decision
competences for all policies and budgetary issues with institutions at the supranational
level. Even more, the competence to allocate competences, the “Kompetenz-Kompetenz”
rests with supranational institutions. Member states would be left with implementing
powers of the legislative decisions taken at the central level. A European federal state would
have a federal parliament which elects a government accountable to the parliament. In a two
chamber form, the second chamber consisting of representatives of member states, would
also engage in legislation at the supranational level.
Using the analytic scheme described above, in view of actors’ preferences over outcomes





the decision-making process, what is the plausibility that a European state will come about
in the near future?
Which are the main actors’, i.e. large member states’ and institutions’, preferences over the
outcome of a political union which would mean moving from a federation of states to a federal
state? The large member states’ governments’ preferences, with the exception of France under
the Presidency of the Republic of Macron, i.e. Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, for a political
union at the cost of national sovereignty, are assumed to be against such a political union that
would imply a substantial additional uploading of national competences. France with its plan
for a fiscal union and a European finance minister may come closest to a step in direction of a
political union. However, in the outline of its view, the powers of a finance minister (of raising
a European tax and at which level for a European budget) remain unspecified. But none of the
other governments have proposed such a plan or supported Macron’s plan until most recently
in a very modest form. The German Government’s chancellor’s response has arrived
hesitantly and offered some support for a very restricted form of fiscal union. In all member
states, in view of the increasing weight of right- and left-wing anti-European and anti-
immigration parties, mainstream parties see themselves under pressure from populist parties
using voters’ discontent and anti-elite sentiments to build their strengths, to adjust their
agendas against an ever closer union (if ever they favored one)[1]. Thus, except for a few small
member states such as Belgium and Luxemburg which tend to favor a closer union, there is
very little support for a political union from most national governments. In view of
particularly strong sovereignist tendencies in the Visegrad countries, the preferences clearly
are very diverse. Moreover, the so-called Hanse 2.0, with the Netherlands, the Scandinavian
member states and the Baltic states, exert pressure in the direction of repatriating
competences or at least strengthening the subsidiarity principle.
In contrast, the supranational institutions, i.e. the Commission and the European
Parliament (EP), as to judge from the Four and Five Presidents Reports, as well as the Juncker
proposal of 2017 for a transformation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into a
European Monetary Fund (EMF) under the Commission’s direction, point to preferences for a
political union, at least for the Eurozone countries. The EP in its majority supports these plans
of the Commission which would constitute steps in the direction of parliamentary democracy
in the EU in which the EP elects the (Commission) government. The European Council, by
contrast, reflecting the member states’ positions, is assumed to predominantly oppose a
political union. In sum, actors’ preferences over outcomes are very diverse.
Linking these preferences to the given macro conditions, I argue that the main conditions
influencing actors’ preferences over outcomes and therefore the decision-making outcomes are
the handling of the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis, both on-going processes. This is
because both conflicts imply redistributive issues. In the course of the crises the unwillingness
to redistribute financial capacity and refugees across the members of the Union emerged very
quickly. Thus, the interventions to solve the Euro, the sovereign debt and banking crisis led to
a cleavage between creditor and debtor states. Both crises have not reinforced solidarity
among member states, quite the opposite, they led to a North-South divide in economic and
financial governance as well as a to a West-East divide as regards the willingness to accept
refugees. Overall these distributive issues strengthened centrifugal tendencies and weakened
the political will of member states to support a deeper political union.
Adding the factor, decision-making rule, i.e. the fact that incisive decisions as regards a
reform of the institutional architecture of the EU and the Eurozone have to be taken under
unanimity rule, it follows from this majority of a actors disinclination to form a European
federal state, that a comprehensive treaty change in favor of a deepening union is unlikely
to happen.
What is more, even if governments had the same preferences for a political union, the




treaty reform introduces an element of uncertainty. In the light of populist anti-European
public opinion in an increasing number of member states would render the adoption of such
a treaty change highly unlikely. A further institutional restriction to be taken into account is
the national institutional rule that national parliaments have to confirm a treaty change.
Some national constitutional courts, such as the German Constitutional Court, request that
the national parliament has to confirm an uploading of national competences to the
European level.
In conclusion, given actors’ diverse preferences over outcomes, the negative influence of
redistributive crisis hanging over Europe with its centrifugal impact and the requirement to
adopt a treaty change by unanimity and submit it to national parliaments’ confirmation
and/or to referenda in some member states, render this first path of development unlikely.
Path 2: differentiation/two-speed Europe
Differentiation or two-speed/two-tier Europe is defined as a differentiation as to individual
member states participating in joint policy making in specific areas, i.e. being offered opt-ins
and opt-outs; a second feature is the designed co-operation of some member states in joint
policy making and joint institutions across various policy areas (core Europe), while others
locate themselves around this core participating only in a free trade area, or a common
market area with specific freedoms.
As assumed under Scenario 1, it is assumed that actors’ preferences about how to shape
the institutional architecture of the European polity are diverse, ranging from a few small
member states favoring a political union, over a sizable number of large and small member
states favoring a more differentiated, two-tier development path of development. The
Commission and the Parliament are assumed to favor a deepening of a political union and to
be skeptical vis-à-vis a differentiated union whereas the European Council, given diverse
preferences of member governments, are assumed to favor a differentiated or flexible
integration course.
The macro conditions, as under Scenario 1, are assumed to be a persisting impact of the
financial/Eurozone crisis and resulting economic recession in a few member states and the
persisting refugee/migration crisis. Both, given the diverse preferences over outcomes tend
to deepen the conflicts and increase the difficulties of finding common solutions to
redistributive problems.
Since – as under Scenario 1 – unanimity is required to adopt a treaty reform and such
reforms would need to be corroborated by national parliaments or in national referenda, in
the light of diverse preferences over outcomes, only incremental changes or a decision-
making deadlock can be expected. As regards policy measures in which co-decision and
qualified majority vote are required, nonetheless consensual decision making is still very
frequent. Hence, pressure to accommodate diverse interests more than ever lead to
incremental changes and compromises in the form of opt outs and increased voluntary co-
operation. Thus, in reaction to the Eurozone crisis, we did not experience a big leap toward a
political union. Rather the Six Pack and Two Pack, the Fiscal Compact, the ESM, and
Banking Union and Open Monetary Transactions, reflect a mixed picture of deepening co-
operation or centralization on the one hand and a strengthening of intergovernmental
governance on the other. While the Eurozone group strengthened its own power of crisis
management, Germany and other northern creditor states, resisted further centralization in
the form of common bond issuance or other measures to mutualize sovereign debt (Barber,
2016). By contrast, when Germany, and more recently, Italy, tried to lead in a redistributive
solution of the refugee crisis, they failed. What emerged is the notion of “flexible solidarity,”
where a solution of a redistributive problem offers different options in which to contribute.
Instead of taking in refugees some member states may to contribute to border control





trade the threatened rejection of the CETA agreement with Canada by Belgium gave rise to
a proposed new solution that Belgium could be excluded from the parts of the agreement
which go beyond common competences while keeping it as a member under common
competences (Bubrowski, 2016).
In conclusion, given actors’ diverse preferences over the desirability of the four paths of
development, the influence of redistributive crises with their centrifugal impact, and given
the need to adopt a treaty change by unanimity and submit it to national parliaments’
consent and to referenda in some member states makes it more likely that compromises are
found in small steps. These small steps result in differentiated integration, such as opt-out
clauses, a re-definition of solidarity, voluntary co-operation in some areas, in short, a more
flexible union with diverse degrees of association which are not irreversible (Schmid, 2016).
Path 3: covert integration
Covert integration is defined as a deepening of integration in terms of the uploading of
policy-making competences and a definition of more stringent common policy solutions
which take place outside of the main formal democratic political decision-making arenas,
Council, European Council and EP.
As under paths 1 and 2, actors preferences as regards the future design on the European
institutional architecture, a deepening, a differentiated integration or a disintegration of the
EU are assumed to diverge.
Similarly, the macro conditions, pressure of the financial crisis and the resulting
economic recession in some member states, as well as the on-going refugee/migration crisis,
are assumed to persist. Both, given the diverse preferences over outcomes tend to deepen the
conflicts and increase the difficulties of finding common solutions to redistributive
problems. However, as opposed to paths 2 under which differentiated solutions of
integration are chosen in a process of designed and negotiated treaty revisions and policy
changes in the central political arenas, under path 3, these macro conditions are expected to
lead to a process of covert integration, i.e. incremental policy and institutional changes
invisible to the wider public.
This hidden process of deepening integration is a consequence of the existing formal
decision-making rules, i.e. unanimity or consensus rules. Decision making under these
conditions increases the likeliness of vague formulations. Even under QMV given diverse
preferences and the prevalent consensus practice, decision outcomes often are compromises
containing vague formulations. This in turn allows for a re-bargaining of the specifics of a
policy or an institutional rule in the course of their implementation. If actors in favor of
deepening integration prevail in renegotiations, covert integration takes place outside of the
public attention of the open arenas (Héritier, 1999, 2016). Another typical route of
specification of vague framework decisions is through executive or judicial actors with
preferences for deepening integration; further routes are formulating policy changes in
highly technical details, or cutting big salient controversial issues into small, technical, low
salience issues which are not in the eye of public attention; the use of soft modes of
integration based on voluntariness and/or including private actors in public policy making
is yet another one, using soft power like benchmarking with naming and shaming as a
means of deepening policy integration; or the introduction of parallel options of regulation,
European and national, may lead to a crowding out of national regulations by European
regulations because private actors comply with European regulations to save transaction
costs; moreover, a delegation of decisions to independent regulatory authorities acting
outside the political arena[2] is another important mode of deepening integration outside of
the political arenas. A further mode of invisible integration of EU policies happens through
transversal policies, such as competition policy. State aids, for instance, under the control of




shaping competences. By conditioning the acceptance of state aid on soft Commission policy
criteria, member states see themselves induced to follow these criteria (Blauberger, 2009).
In the past decades, a considerable part of deepening European policy integration
evolved through these multiple, covert paths. Covert integration “through the back door,”
raises obvious problems of democratic legitimation of European policy making once citizens
realize that the extent of integration has progressed without their being aware of it.
In conclusion, given actors’ diversity of preferences of outcomes of future shape of Union,
and given demanding decision-making rules of unanimity or consensus, covert integration
is a likely path to be chosen and in fact has been used frequently in the past decades. The
status quo of policy making is changed invisibly and without explicit democratic
confirmation in the central political arenas, a circumstance which may trigger an anti-
European backlash (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014).
Path 4: disintegration/dissolution
Features of disintegration are defined first, as a repatriation of specific policy-making
competences to the national level or the opting out of member states of specific joint policy
areas; second, it may take the shape of the exit of individual member states of the Monetary
Union or/and the EU entirely, such as decided in the Brexit vote of June 2016; third, the
dissolution of the entire Union is a planned step of designed institutional change of
abolishing the Union altogether.
Actors’ preferences are assumed not to favor a dissolution of the union, the third
option. This holds for all member states and for the Commission and the EP. Preferences
for the second option, i.e. referenda over an exit of the EU, as in Britain, are unlikely to be
launched in other member states. Nor have explicit governmental positions of member
states been put forward calling for a referendum over an exit from the monetary union.
With increasing pressure of anti-European radical parties, however, and their possible
electoral victories, such referenda cannot be excluded. The preferences of member states
as regards the first option, i.e. repatriation of competences, are diverse. With the
strengthening of the Visegrad formation of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and
Slovakia, as well as the Hanse 2.0 formation of the Netherlands, the Baltic states and
Scandinavian states such preferences have become more pronounced with respect to
migration policy (Visegrad) and fiscal policy (Hanse 2.0).
The macro conditions, as under paths 1, 2 and 3 are assumed to be a persistent impact of
the financial/Eurozone crisis and resulting economic recession in some member states and
the on-going refugee/migration crisis. Both, given the diverse preferences over outcomes
tend to deepen the conflicts and increase the difficulties of finding common solutions to
redistributive problems.
The decision-making rule to bring about a treaty change with the intention of abolishing
of the Union requires member states’ unanimous decision. Given diverse preferences, and
the lack of unanimity, it is unlikely to materialize. Individual national referenda over an exit
from the union as individual steps of disintegration are more easily organized. Incentives to
resort to such referenda would depend not only on the relative gain a country would draw
economically from an exit, on geopolitical factors, on the handling of distributional economic
and migration issues, the contentedness with the own national policies and institutions
(De Vries, 2016), but also the specific trade deal negotiated with Britain in the next years.
Conclusion: Fluctuat nec mergitur
From the analysis of the political dynamics resulting from actors preferences, macro
conditions and given institutional rules, it is concluded that of the four possible paths,
path 2 of differentiated integration, multi-tier Europe and path 3 of a continuing





disintegration/dissolution, are the most likely to happen. It appears plausible to expect that
the EU will continue “to be tossed, but will not sink” ( fluctuat nec mergitur) and will
continue to be a “half-way house between intergovernmental co-operation and
supranational powers” (Barber, 2016). Yet, floating along and reacting incrementally in
the face of important changes in the economic and social environment may not be enough,
and in the case of path 3, risky, since covert integration “through the back door,” raises
obvious problems of democratic legitimation of European policy making. When citizens at
one point realize that integration has considerably deepened through hidden channels,
without their being aware of it, this may trigger a backlash, manifesting itself, for instance,
in the negative outcome of national referenda on European issues.
Going beyond the analysis of what might plausibly happen, a normative view would also
argue that piecemeal interventions as a reaction to multiple crises tend to reinforce executive
and non-majoritarian actors because they incur less coordination costs as compared to
legislative action and treaty revisions. It also means that overall considerations of
“reinventing the union” are not tackled.
Notwithstanding, more recently, proposals for institutional reforms have been put forward
from various quarters. Some relate to the overall structure of the EU, others to specific
institutional elements of the Eurozone governance. The most far-reaching plan was proposed
by Martin Schulz, the then leader of the Social Democratic Party for a “United States of Europe
end of 2017”. It was met with “deafening silence” (Muenchau, 2017). The outcome of this
advance reflects the analysis made under path 1: the failure of a plan to establish a federal state.
As regards Eurozone governance, far-reaching proposals were introduced by the French
President, Emmanuel Macron, as well as the President of the Commission, Jean-Claude
Juncker. While Macron aims at a reform of the Eurozone architecture, proposing a Eurozone
budget, a Eurozone finance minister and a Eurozone parliament, the Commission’s proposals
in particular aim at bringing the intergovernmental elements of economic governance created
during the financial crisis, in particular the ESM, an intergovernmental agreement, into the
institutional framework of the EU (Muenchau, 2017). It also provides for the introduction of a
single minister of finance, a Eurozone budget and supports the proposal of transforming the
EMS into a EMF[3] (Khan, 2017), as originally proposed by Germany in December 2017.
Supported by the EP, the Commission moreover proposes that the EMF, which would develop
new financial capacity, be subject to the normal legislative procedure. It would be able to build
up a fund to give short-term loans to countries in economic difficulties and serve as a backstop
for the funds that the EU’s banking resolution authority uses in rescuing banks. According to
the Commission, the EMF would be accountable to the EP. The latter would be able to hold
hearings with the agency’s head and would receive full yearly reports from the EMF on its
activities (Smith-Meyer, 2018).
By contrast, the Council is seeking to set up the EMF without resorting to the legislative
process, but to maintain intergovernmental control over the EMF, as is presently the case
under the ESM. For this purpose it has set up an informal task force reporting to the
Economic and Financial Committee[4]. During the height of the financial crisis it had
established the “task force on coordinated action” (Smith-Meyer, 2018) to facilitate co-
operation among finance ministers. Subsequently it made preparing work for the ESM,
which is run by Eurozone finance ministers. It is the Economic and Financial Committee’s
task force that the Council now charged to deal with the Commission’s EMF proposal to
transform the ESM into an EMF. It is unlikely that it will follow the recommendation to
subject the EMF to be accountable to the EP (Smith-Meyer, 2018). Eurozone heads of state
will decide in March 2018 on the EMF initiative (Muenchau, 2017). This attempt of the
Council to circumvent the Commission proposal by using existing, largely unknown, bodies





Closely linked to the described plans of how to reform financial and economic
governance institutions in the Eurozone, there is another on-going important debate
centering on whether to go for a full fiscal union or, more modestly, to complete the Banking
Union by adding to the Single Supervision Mechanism and to the Single Resolution
Mechanism a Eurozone-wide deposit insurance scheme. It appears that in the face of a stiff
opposition primarily from northern member states the plan of a fiscal union is unlikely to
materialize and the steps are at present directed to a completion of the Banking Union.
However, this process has at present run into a deadlock over the question of whether banks
should first engage in risk reduction (northern member states) before going for a
risk-sharing mechanism as favored by a France-led coalition of southern member states
(Brunsden et al., 2018). Both fiscal union and the deposit insurance fund under Banking
Union are redistributive questions, albeit of a different scale. In December 2018 finance
ministers at least agreed to further discuss a possible future Eurozone budget and to
provide more financial means for the European Stability Mechanism (Brunsden and khan,
2018). The deposit insurance fund raises the redistributive questions, as well, but – given
that the two first important components SSM and SRM already exist –may be introduced in
a differentiated[5] an incremental way or allow for some differentiation and flexibility.
This would reflect path 2.
Finally, an option of a transformed EU architecture has to be mentioned where the overall
objective is to re-build the EU in the sense of both selective deeper integration and at the same
time devolution or repatriation of competences. According to this view, where there is an
urgent need of joint action, such as in foreign and security policy as well as migration and
asylum policy, competences should be pooled. By contrast, other tasks with no trans-border
effects such as some areas in environmental law, health, consumer policy, as well as labor law
could be repatriated (Papier, 2016)[6]. The principle of an ever closer union would be reversed
to a need for a compelling legitimation of further communitarization. Such a recomposition of
the EU with a simultaneous partial devolution of competences and partial additional
communitarization would allow consensus building based on a compensation mechanism.
Notes
1. In Finland the right-wing populists are part of the governing coalition. In Denmark they supported
the governing coalition for 10 years, as was the case in the Netherlands although over a shorter
period; in Poland and Hungary they dominate the governments (Hutter et al., 2016). In Sweden, the
Sweden Democrats have gained considerable ground in the election of 2018.
2. Or what Bickerton et al. under their notion of new intergovernmentalism call “de novo bodies”
(Bickerton et al., 2015).
3. The German proposal provides for restructuring requests to countries receiving funds from the EMF.
4. Created in 1999 to review the economic and financial situation of member states.
5. Such as by allowing for access to a deposit insurance fund under differentiated economic conditions.
6. Such options were discussed at the Bratislava Summit emphasizing that policy delivery was the
order of the day, focusing on the economy/employment, security, i.e. fighting terrorism; protecting
outside borders, digitalization (Herszenkron, 2016).
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